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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

THOMAS CHESTER PERRY,

12611

Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction
by jury of the charge of robbery in the Court

of the Fourt Judicial District, The Honorable
Joseph E. Nelson, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by jury trial
January 14, 1970, and sentenced to the Utah
State Prison to the indeterminate term on
January 21, 1970, as provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant prays for a reversal of.
the judgment of conviction .and for an order

1.

of this Court remanding the case to the
Fourth Judicial District for further
proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of Appellant's brief,
the transcripts of testimony will be hereinafter characterized as "P." which will
denote the testimony adduced at preliminary
hearing, and "T." for testimony at time of
trial of the matter.
On December 12, 1968, two men
entered the residence of David Harness in
Orem, Utah.

While one of these men

remained with the wife and family of Mr.
Harness, the other forced Mr. Harness to
transport him to the Allen Super Save
Market in Orem, Utah, which Mr. Harness
then managed.

Subsequent to their arrival

at the store, this second man, whom it is
alleged and maintained is the accused,
there required Mr. Harness to remove the
contents of the store safe, approximately
$5,000, and place it in his possession.

The money in hand, this second man then
rejoined his partner at the Harness'
residence and were not seen again thereafter.
Witnesses who testified to these
various events are as follows:

David

Harness,

his wife

(P. 13-42; T. 23-40);

Darlene Harness,

(P. 42-63; T. 40-53);

Clark Burgner Naylor, (P. 63-76; T. 67-74);
Floyd Hallsey, (P. 76-90; T. 53-62); his
wife, Ruth Hallsey, (P. 90-98; T. 62-67);
and Dean Olsen, (T. 74-77).
It was established by testimony of
these witnesses, and more pointedly by the
testimony of the investigating officers, ·
that, aside from the eyewitness identification
of the accused, there was absolutely no
palpable evidence or information of any kind
which might tend to link the Appellant to
the offense charged.

(Officer Kenneth

Pilkington, P. 100, L. 9-16;

Officer Val

Kilpack, P. 111, L. 16 to P. 112, L. 14).
There exists in the record no circumstantial
or other competent evidence which would be

probative of this accused's guilt;

save

the testimony of the eyewitness, the record
is barren of such evidence.
With one possible exception, Dean
Olsen, each of the previously mentioned
eyewitnesses, after having been shown a
series of pictures from which the Appellant
was identified as the perpetrator of the
robbery, the Orem police then informed
the witness that the individual he:.- had·.
identified was involved in a crime of
uniquely similar fact situation in the
State of California.

(Officer Pilkington,

T. 8, L. 25 to T. 9, L. 26;

David Harness,

P. 25, L. 25 to P. 26, L. 9;

Harness, P. 55, L. 12-30;

Darlene

Clark Burnger

Naylor, P. 74, L. 6-30).
The testimony of each witness, with
the notable exception of Dean Olsen, also
indicated that at the incipience of the
preliminary hearing, when Appellant was
first seen by these eyewitnesses, the
4.

Appellant was in the custody of police
officers and was wearing handcuffs.
(David Harness, P. 40, L. 7-15; P. 41,
L. 6-30; Darlene Harness, T. 51, L. 23 to
T. 52, L. 20;

Clark Naylor, P. 75, L. 16-20

and T. 73, L. 10-21;
L. 21-30;
P. 97, L.

Floyd Hallsey, P. 89,

Ruth Hallsey, P. 96, L. 23-29;
28-30; T. 65, L. 17-28).

Of critical importance is the testimony of Dean Olsen, who was not present at
the

prelimi~ary

hearing it appears, and had

not seen the accused prior to the time of
trial according to his own testimony.
L. 23-26).

(T. 75,

Mr. Olsen ultimately identified

a member of the jury as the individual who
committed the crime which he had witnessed
under no different circumstances from those
under which the other witnesses viewed the
crime.

Olsen stated that, "If I were to

name anyone that looks anything like the
individual that approached us, I would
say the second man here on the front row."
5.

(T. 77, L. 13-19;

also see T. 76, L. 20-30}.

The Court will readily note the unlikelihood
of the Appellant being seated in the jury
box.

Based in part upon the testimony
elicited at the preliminary hearing, defense
counsel made a motion to suppress the
testimony of witnesses David Harness,
Darlene Harness, Clark Naylor, Floyd
Hallsey, and Ruth Hallsey. (R. 16-19;
T. 7, L.9 to T. 20, L.9}.
denied.

(T. 20, L. 10}.

The motion was
And again at

the close of trial, defense counsel moved
for a directed verdict of not guilty on the
same basis as the previous motion to
suppress, now enhanced by the fact that
the only witness the State produced at trial
who was not in court when the Appellant
was in the custody of police and in handcuffs, and who had obviously not been
coached, failed to identify the Appellant.
This motion was likewise denied.
6.

(T. 78,

L. 3 0 to T. 8 0 , L • 19 ) •
It should also be noted that in
conjunction with these previously mentioned
motions, defense counsel strenuously
objected to the fatal variance between
the Complaint,

(R. 4), which charge

Appellant with having committed the
offense of

11

Armed Robbery," a character-

ization to which counsel did not object,
by " • • •

tak(ing) from the presence of

David Harness, and from the safe of
Allens Super Save Market . . . the sum
of approximately $5,000.00 . . . ,

11

(emphasis added), and the Information,
(R. 13), which charged Appellant with
the crime of robbery in that

11

•

•

•

the

said Thomas Chester Perry did, with force
of arms, take personal property from the
possession of David Harness, against his
Will.

II

(T. 20, L. 14-24;

T. 79, L. 29).

The Complaint alleges an offense against
the possession of Allen's Super Save and
the Information alleges an offense against

David Harness, a different offense and
therefor a fatal variance.

The motions

to dismiss the Information on this ground
were likewise denied.
L.

(T. 22, L. 7; T. 80,

19).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING

TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED AT
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
AT THE CONCLUSION OF TRIAL, AS THE IN-COURT
IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT WAS TAINTED BY
AN

IMPROPERLY SUGGESTIVE PRETRIAL IDENTIF-

ICATION PROCEEDURE.
"Almost all knowledgable authorities
agree that eyewitness identification is
the most unreliable form of proof."

The

Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, Daniel
E. Murray, 1966 Utah Law Rev., 611.

Because

of the inherent frailness of proof of the
8.

kind involved in the subject case, i.e.,
eyewitness identification, it is incumbent
upon the judicial process to take special
care to insure that such proof is not
tainted by unnecessary and highly persuasive
suggestion.

This is especially so where,

as here, the entire quantum of proof rests
in the visual recognition of the accused,
and nothing more.
Appellant here asserts that the
little rogue's gallery of photographs which
the witnesses viewed in order to make their
identification prior to trial was conducted
in a fashion calculated to emphasize the
"we've got the man" psychology which is so
productive in crystallizing an honest but
unsure identification into one steadfast
and wrong.

If these witnesses picked out

a man who looked much the same as the man
they had seen on the day of the crime,
Officer Pilkington dutifully served to
expunge all remaining doubt from their minds.
9.

Note the following colloquy between defense
counsel and Officer Pilkington at hearing on
the motion to suppress:

Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:

Q:

A:
Q:
A:

Officer, you did make an
investigation of the reported
event of December 12?
Yes sir.
In connection with that investigation, did you talk with the
witnesses who have been sworn
here today, that is David Harness,
Darlene Harness, Clark Naylor,
Ruth Hallsey, and Floyd Hallsey?
I did.
Did you show each of these
witnesses pictures of Mr. Perry?
I did.

Let me ask you if you informed
each of the witnesses that Mr.
Perry had been charged with and
convicted of a criminal offense
that bore a great deal of similarity
to the offense which these witnesses
witnessed in Orem, and that charge
and conviction had taken place
in the State of California?
Not prior to the witnesses
identifying the picture.
After identifying the pictures
you did inform them?
That a similar crime had been
committed in California.
( T • 8 , L • 2 5 to T . 9 , L . 2 6 ) •

The officer seemed here to feel th?t
so long as the picture was identified, he
could then say anything he wished about the
,

I\

subject portrayed, in effect stating to
the witness:

"We have the man."

This primary taint was then heightened
by the fact that all witnesses, now armed

with the conviction that the individual in
custody had been involved in a similar type
of crime in another state, were allowed
to view the Appellant in handcuffs in police
custody.

If any doubt remained as to

whether the person in the picture was the
man in question it was dispelled at that
point, because, having seen the Appellant
in custody with handcuffs on and relating
the accused's in person appearance back to
the photograph and the officer's suggestive
statement respecting the individual portrayed,
if the witness didn't recall the actual
appearance of the man involved in the robbery,
he had now a familiar face and thus a readily
believable substitute.

The question is:

what

was being identified, the man in the picture
or the perpetrator of the crime?
11.

The trial which might determine the
accused's fate may well not be that
in the court room but that at the
pretrial confrontation, with the
State aligned against the accused,
the sole witness the jury, and the
accused unprotected against overreaching, intentional or unintentional,
with little or no effective appeal
from the judgment there rendered by
the witness ---- "that's the man."
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, at 235,236.
The specific problem of the instant
case is dealt with in Simmons v. U.S., 390
U.S. 377:

It must be recognized that improper
employment of photographs by police
may sometimes cause witnesses to
err in identifying criminals.
. . . The chance of misidentification
is also heightened if the police
indicate to the witness that they
have other evidence that one of the
persons pictured committed the crime.
Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, the
witness thereafter is apt to retain
in his memory the image of the
photograph rather than of the person
actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or
courtroom identification. 390 U.S.
at 383, 384.
What the Court in Simmons is the probability
that suggestive statements are likely to
confirm a misidentification.
12.

This case

provides a paradigm example.

It is of

no small importance that the only witness
called by the State as an eyewitness who had
not apparently been previously coached
failed miserably in identifying the defendant.
The verdict and judgment below should be set
aside on the ground that ". . . the photographic proceedure was so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification."
U.S. at384.

Simmons, supra, 390

At least, the testimony of

the witnesses at the preliminary hearing
should have been suppressed.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
THE INFORMATION FOR RECITING

A.1\1

OFFENSE IN

SUBSTANTIAL AND FATAL VARIANCE FROM THE
ALLEGATIONS SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT.
As has been pointed out in pages 7
and 8 of this brief, a variance in the
the charges existed

between Complaint and
13.

Information existed at time of trial and
counsel objected thereto.

Appellant's only

contention on appeal is that this discrepancy
should be clarified, and a new trial granted
to eliminate the prejudice.

The mischief

created is that Appellant was bound over
from the preliminary hearing on a charge
materially different from that upon which
he was tried.

Such an error, actually

having prejudiced the defendant in respect
to a substantial right, is grounds for
vitiating the entire proceeding.
U.C.A., 1953.

77-53-2,

Being tried for an alleged

offense materially different from the
charge upon which defendant was bound over
for is a serious violation of the accused's
right to the due process of the law where
his liberty hangs in the balance.

Art. I,

§7, Utah Constitution; Amendment 14, §1,
United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Whereforf Defendant-Appellant
prays that the verdict and judgment of the
I

14.

trial court be vacated and this case
remanded to the Fourth District Court
of Utah County for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

HERSCHEL BULLEN
Attorney for DefendantAppellant.
409 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

